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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
its function in subsequent cases, but it is to be hoped that exceptions will be
made to unambiguous statutes only when the undesired result would be obviously
and violently in conflict with the Legislature's clear purpose. The job of
correcting ineffectively drawn statutes belongs to the Legislature.
Besides the danger of encroaching upon the legislative function, another
danger is ever present when a court gives a statute a questionable interpreta-
tion in order to meet a particular situation. Namely, it oft times creates more
problems than it corrects. For example, in the present case the Court appears
to take the position that an injured employee can renounce a compensation
award, at least where he has not received payment of it.3 9 Moreover, in its
anxiety to compensate this particular plaintiff, the Court apparently overlooked
the fact that the Legislature had already remedied the situation. Effective as
of May 1, 1959, and applying to injuries incurred from that date on, is Section
26-a of the Workmen's Compensation Law. This Section establishes an "Unin-
sured Employers' Fund" (and is a good example of the advantages in allowing
these problems to be cured by the Legislature itself). Subdivision seven states:
All the rights, powers, and benefits of the employer under section
twenty-nine of this chapter shall become the rights, powers and'benefits
of the fund, in any case in which the fund has paid or is paying com-
pensation to an injured employee or his dependents under this
section.
40
The Section provides that the Fund will pay the compensation award in a
case, like the present one, where the employer is uninsured and doesn't pay
the award. It will be interesting to see how subdivision seven will be inter-
preted, since it may be argued that the Court has in effect held, in the present
case, that the employer has no "rights, powers, and benefits . . . under sec-
tion twenty-nine" until he has paid the award, in which case Section 26-a
would not apply.
EXTENT OF COMPENSATION CARnmt's LiEN ON EmPLOYEE'S
THIRD PARTY AcTIoN RECOVERY
The Workmen's Compensation Law provides, inter alia:
If an employee entitled to compensation under this chapter be in-
jured or killed by the negligence of another not in the same employ,
his dependents need not elect to take compensation . . . [but may]
pursue his remedy against such other.
In such case . . . the . . . insurance carrier liable for the pay-
ment of such compensation . . . shall have a lien on the proceeds of
39. "Although the question is not really before us, we, for consistency, state our
view that, although the workmen's compensation award is still of record, plaintiff has
renounced and voided that award by asserting here his ownership of the third-party suit."
Supra note 30 at 53, 194 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1959).
This raises the question of whether the injured employee can revoke the award after
partial or full payment but before the assignee has brought suit. It would appear to be.
doubtful-see supra note 31.
40. Note how this wording avoids the problem which gave rise to the present case.
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any recovery from such other ... to the extent of the total amount
of compensation awarded under or provided or estimated by this
chapter for such case and the expenses for medical treatment paid,
or to be paid by it.
'41
If a dependent should accept the option and make a recovery, the effect would
be to excuse the compensation carrier from making further payments, to the
extent to which such recovery reduced the total amount of payments the
carrier was liable for under the Act.
The widow of Vito Campanelli, after receiving benefit payments and
funeral expenses totaling $5,000, brought suit under the above quoted pro-
vision. A judgment,42 for $150,000, was thereafter reduced to $105,000 by the
Appellate Division,4 3 and a compromise settlement for that amount was affected
while appeal was pending to the Court of Appeals.
As administratrix of the estate of her husband, the widow moved in
Surrogate's Court to have the settlement approved and the proceeds distributed.
At this point petitioner, the compensation carrier, applied (under Section 29
quoted above) for a lien against so much of the widow's share of the settlement
as would reimburse it for money already paid out as funeral expense and bene-
fits, and further, for all money the Compensation Board would require it to
pay into the "Aggregate Trust Fund.144 , Section 27 of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law provides that upon the death of a covered employee, the Com-
pensation Board shall determine, by the use of mortality and remarriage tables,
the present value of all the payments which the carrier will be liable to make
as death benefits payable to the dependent. The Board shall direct the car-
rier to pay a lump sum representing the total of such payments into an Aggre-
gate Trust Fund. The Section also provides that if a recovery is made by the
dependent (under Section 29), the carrier will then be liable only for that
portion of the lump sum payment which would remain after deducting the
amount of the dependent's recovery. In any event the carrier is discharged
from further liability upon making the prescribed payment, while the Fund
assumes the risk that the dependent will live longer than the calculated time.
There was no dispute as to the appropriateness of the carrier's claim to
reimbursement for the $5,000 already paid out. The controversy was in regard
to the claim for reimbursement of the "deficiency payment." The carrier
maintained that the language of Section 29, "... a lien . . . to the total
amount of compensation awarded . . . or estimated . . .", included the
amount which it would be required by the Board to pay into the Fund. The
widow contended that such a literal construction of the language was incon-
sistent with the purposes of the statute.
In affirming decisions of the Surrogate and the Appellate Division
41. N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 29.
42. Campanelli v. Kretzer, - Misc. -, 142 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
43. 1 A.D.2d 1024, 151 N.Y.S.2d 516 (2d Dep't 1956).
44. In re Campanelli's Estate, 15 Misc. 2d 663, 181 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Surr. Ct. 1958).
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denying the carrier's lien for reimbursement of the deficiency payment,4 5 the
Court of Appeals, in In re Campenelli's Estate,4 6 held that although a literal
construction of the language of Section 29 would bear out the carrier's position,
still it could not have been the Legislature's intent to provide a lien for monies
which the carrier had an inescapable duty to pay in the first instance.
The Court's reasoning, in this case of first impression, leaves little room
for doubt as to its correctness. There are two main, grounds for the decision.
First, the Court emphasizes the fact that were it not for the recovery made
in the wrongful death action, the carrier would be liable for the entire amount
necessary to cover payments over the widow's expected life span. Thus, the
carrier should not be heard to complain when the amount of the recovery does
not fully relieve this burden. Second, simple mathematics demonstrates the
proposition that "such an unreasonable result could not possibly have been
within the legislative design."4' If the widow's recovery was insufficient to
maintain payments over her life span, the carrier would have to make up the
deficiency. If the widow suffered a lien on the recovery to the extent of that
payment, it is apparent that the size of the recovery would be reduced a like
amount. When so reduced, the recovery would no longer be sufficient to cover
the period originally determined to be its limit.
By so deciding, the Court has avoided a rather odd result. A contrary
decision would have forced the widow, in effect, to pay her own compensation.
SPECIAL FUND FOR REOPENED CASES NOT LIABLE FOR REOPENED
WORa1cEN'S COMPENSATION AWARD
On April 27, 1942, claimant's compensation claim, arising out of an in-
dustrial accident in 1940, was closed with a lump sum award as a settlement
in the amount of $3,000 plus an award at a weekly rate of $9.23 for disability
from the date of the accident to the date of the hearing. The medical report
at the hearing disclosed that claimant, who had received an average weekly
wage of $13.85 before the accident, was partially disabled. On May 4, 1954,
claimant requested a reopening of his claim for further consideration. The
request was granted and the Board subsequently made the award appealed
from for disability over a period of 25Y2 weeks from October 31, 1954 to
April 13, 1955, at the same rate as originally paid of $9.23 a week. 48
The sole question presented by Weyzk v. Town of Stafford49 is whether
the compensation award of May 4, 1954 should be borne by the employer's
carrier, as in the usual case, or by the Special Fund for Reopened Cases. The
statutory law as to the division of responsibility seems clear, but it's application
presents difficulty in this case. Under the Workmen's Compensation Law,
45. 9 A.D.2d 937, 196 N.Y.S.2d 572 (2d Dep't 1959).
46. 8 N.Y.2d 173, 203 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1960).
47. Id. at 177, 203 N.YS.2d 83.
48. Weyzk v. Town of Stafford, 8 A.D.2d 560, 183 N.Y.S.2d 481 (3d Dep't 1959).
49. 7 N.Y.2d 121, 195 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1959).
